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Memory for Locations
Abstract
Four-year-olds searched for a lost object on two occasions. On
the first occasion, half the children searched a three
dimensional table-top model for a missing item after watching a
sequence of events in which a doll lost the item; the rest of the
children searched under naturalistic conditions, looking for an
object that had been lost while they tidied away some toys. Half
the children were then questioned about their search behaviors,
following which all children participated in the second search
task--a table-top search task. For the first task, more searches
were in the "critical area" (those locations bounded by the last
place the item was seen and the first place it was found to be
missing) if children searched in the naturalistic rather than the
table-top condition. In the second task, children searched in
the "critical area" more often if they were queried about their
search behavior in the first task, or if they had searched
initially in the naturalistic task. The results are discussed in
terms of factors affecting the development of problem solving
competence.
Remembering the Right Locations:
Factors Affecting Young Children's
Logical Search Ability
Searching efficiently for a missing object is a complex
problem solving endeavor, dependent upon coordinating the memory
of events, the logical deduction of the possible sub-set of
hiding places, and the implementation of situation-dependent
search strategies. If an adult misplaces an object but is
uncertain of its exact whereabouts, his or her search will
typically be confined to a critical area bounded by the point at
which the object was last seen and the point at which it was
first discovered to be missing. Restricting search to the
critical area is an important skill because it reflects the
ability to infer logically those locations that define the
necessary and sufficent search area. Young children's ability to
use such inference skills and restrict their search to the
critical area appears to be affected by the nature of the search
problem however.
In so-called naturalistic contexts where children visit a
series of locations in a familiar environment and lose an object
en route (e.g., a camera) preschoolers exhibit good logical search
ability and frequently look for the lost object in the critical
area (Anooshion, Hartman, & Scharf, 1982; Haake, Somerville, &
Wellman, 1980; Wellman, Somerville, & Haake, 1979). In contrast,
when the search problem is described with the aid of a three
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dimensional table-top model, and the task is to identify where a
puppet lost a once possessed object for example, 7-year-olds show
poor logical search skills, frequently looking for the lost
object outside of the critical area, and often in locations not
visited (Drozdal & Flavell, 1975).
There are, of course, many differences between the table-top
and the naturalistic search environments that may account for the
use of search skills in the two tasks. However, in the present
research we are more interested in the fact that skill
differences occur in tasks that have a similar underlying
structure, than in the specific reasons for these differences.
Specifically, we are interested in when 4-year-olds would use in
a table-top search task those search skills they putatively use
to guide search activity in naturalistic environments.
One way of characterizing the skills used to locate missing
objects is in terms of the distinction between logical and
pragmatic inference skills (Haake et al., 1980; Paris, 1978). In
using logical inferences, identifying the critical area as the
necessary and sufficient area to search is not dependent on the
search context but can be inferred logically from given
information. In contrast, pragmatic inferences tend to be driven
by real-world knowledge of likely hiding places and knowledge of
object displacement (others move objects). Thus, drawing
pragmatic inferences do not necessarily depend upon coordinating
given information whereas logical inferences do require such a
synthesis.
The decision to use either pragmatic or logical inferences
may depend on the problem, or on a predisposition to search
comprehensively or selectively (Wellman & Somerville, 1982). If
an economically efficient search is not required, comprehensive
searching may occur. However, if search constraints are
operating (e.g., only 3 locations may be searched), it is
important to synthesize search-relevant information and select
locations which have the highest probability of yielding the
missing object. Restricting search to the critical area when
search constraints are operating, then, is a useful index of the
ability to coordinate search-relevant information; however,
little is known about the development of this particular skill.
Generally, young children show a propensity to be strategic
in situations where the task context is maximally supportive of
cognitive activity (Brown & Reeve, in press). Naturalistic
search tasks presumably provide such support and allow the use of
efficient search strategies; however, possessing logical search
competence does not mean it will be used in all situations (e.g.,
in a table-top search task). Nascent cognitive skills are
considered fragile, and may be "welded" to specific task contexts
(Rozin, 1976). If this is true, it may be difficult to induce
young children to use these fragile skills in new or difficult
situations. It is also possible that young children do not use
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skills that are in their repertoire because they do not recognize
contexts that require them, or, if they recognize the context,
are unable to access the relevant cognitive skills (Brown &
Campione, 1984; Flavell, 1981). Understanding when and how young
children are able to access existing skills to solve new problems
is an issue that lies at the heart of developmental theory.
Two findings suggest conditions under which preschool
children may extend their use of logical search skills. Crisafi
and Brown (in press) found that 4-year-olds, but not 2- or 3-
year-olds were able to solve a "difficult" inferential reasoning
problem if they had first solved an easier version of the same
problem. This result is consistent with the view that learners
can be induced to solve increasingly difficult problems by
leading them gradually through an easy-to-difficult problem
sequence (Zeaman & House, 1963). Several other studies have
shown that focussing young children on appropriate problem
solving strategies by asking them task-relevant questions may
facilitate problem solving success (Brown, Kane, & Echols, in
press; Reeve, 1985a). Answering task-appropriate questions
presumably helps children access appropriate problem solving
routines that may be a precondition for their use in solving
relevant problems (Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, & Campione, 1983;
Ericsson & Simon, 1980).
Both easy-to-hard problem sequencing and asking task-
appropriate questions, then, appear to be mechanisms that can
facilitate access to problem solving routines that, in turn, may
increase the probability of the accessed routine being used to
solve a new problem. On the basis of these views, it would be
expected that logical search behavior on a table-top task would
improve if a child searched initially in a naturalistic situation
or were asked questions about effective search behaviors used in
a prior search task. Specifically, the present experiment was
designed to examine whether preschool children's ability to
conduct a logical search on a table-top problem, similar to the
one used by Drozdal and Flavell (1975), would improve as a result
of (a) practice on a different table-top task, (b) practice on a
naturalistic problem, or (c) of being asked questions about
search behaviors on a previous task.
Experiment
Method
Subjects. Sixty-four children with a mean age of 54 months
(range = 44 months to 62 months, SD 4.25 months), recruited from
two predominantly middle-class day care centers in a small mid-
western city, served as subjects. Three subjects (2 boys and 1
girl) were dropped from the study because thay refused to search,
leaving 15 children in each of three conditions, and 16 in the
fourth. An approximately equal number of boys and girls
participated in each of the conditions.
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Design. The design was a 2 (First Task: Naturalistic,
Table-top) x 2 (Probe Questions: Present, Absent) between
subjects factorial.
Procedure and materials. Testing took place in a mobile
laboratory. Children were tested individually, and were brought
to the laboratory putatively to paint a picture. For the first of
the two search problems, half the children searched under
naturalistic conditions, while the other half searched in a
table-top condition. The mobile laboratory itself served as the
search area for the naturalistic task in which children were
asked to help put away seven toys (e.g., pencils, drum, ball,
etc.) that had been left on the art table. The three-dimensional
model used in the table-top search condition consisted of a set
of small boxes (5" x 5" x 5") which were placed on a table so
that a 4-year-old could not see over the top of the boxes when
seated. The table-top model was constructed so that it was
similar to the one used by Drozdal and Flavell (1975).
In the naturalistic search condition the experimenter
gathered the toys from the art table, put them into a large box,
and gave children the toys one at a time so they could be
deposited in their respective storage containers. The storage
containers were of different sizes and colors so that they were
easily discriminable from each other. Overall, there were 10
storage containers, 7 of which were used to store toys. The
experimenter accompanied the child as each of seven toys were
stored in containers that were within reach but above a 4-
year-old's eye level.
While the second toy was being stored, a sheet of stickers
was "discovered" in that toy's container. The stickers were
removed from the toy's container and the child was told that he or
she would be given a sticker when all the toys had been stored;
the stickers were then surreptitiously passed to a confederate.
The stickers were discovered missing while toy six was being
stored; however, both toys six and seven were stored before the
child was asked to search for the missing stickers.
In the table-top task(s) children were told a story about a
toy doll who had, and then lost one of its possessions. The
story line for each of the stories used in the study is presented
in Table 1. Pictures, corresponding to the event in the story,
were affixed to each of seven boxes (rooms) as the action
sequence of the story developed. The pictures measured 3" x 3"
and illustrated explicitly the events described in the story
script (e.g., in Story 1 "Event 3," the picture showed Bert
showing his toy truck to Grover). Overall, 10 boxes were placed
on the table but, like the naturalistic search task, only 7
locations were used.
Insert Table 1 about here
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After completing the initial search task, all children
attempted to find a missing object in a second task, which was
always a table-top problem. For those children who received two
table-top search problems the presentation order of the tasks
were counterbalanced across subjects, and the event sequence
described in the first and the second story started at opposite
ends of the set of boxes.
In all search tasks the critical search area was defined by
locations 2, 3, and 5. Location 1 was the first place visited,
and locations 6 and 7 were visited after the object was
discovered missing. Further, location 4 was always an impossible
hiding place. In the naturalistic task, location 4 was a pencil
box which was too small to conceal the missing stickers; in the
table-top stories the toy doll did not enter the fourth room and,
therefore, could not have lost anything in that room. Finally,
three additional boxes ("rooms") or containers were never visited
and served as memory distractors. For all search problems, the
unused containers were placed slightly apart from the others--one
at the beginning and the end of the sequence, and one above
location 4 (the impossible hiding place). The locations visited
were always next to each other; that is, containers or boxes were
arranged sequentially rather than in a random pattern.
After completing the first, and prior to the second search
task, half of the children who had experienced either the
naturalistic or the table-top tasks were asked questions about
their search behaviors on the first task. The questions were
designed to focus children on the reasons for searching, or not
searching,, in particular locations in the search space. For the
first question, children were asked why they searched in one of
the critical area locations. (All but two children searched in
the critical area at least once.) In the second question,
children were asked why they did not search in the impossible
search location, or why they did if they searched there (see
below). Finally, children were asked why they did not search in
one of the locations not visited. On all questions, children
were encouraged to answer in terms of what they would tell a
friend about their search behavior.
For all search problems, prior to searching for the lost
object, children were asked to recall the order in which all the
locations were visited. The purpose of assessing children's
memory was to determine whether poor search occurred because
children had not remembered the subset of possible hiding places.
In addition, children were told explicitly that they would only
be allowed to search in three locations for the missing item.
The purpose of limiting to three the number of possible searches
was to induce children to search selectively because Wellman and
Somerville (1982) have suggested that young children have a
tendency to search comprehensively. Further, all children were
asked to think carefully about where they should search before
beginning each of their three searches.
11
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Prior to a child searching, the experimenter said she
thought the lost object was probably in one of the boxes/rooms,
the purpose of which was to emphasize the boxes/rooms as likely
hiding places because, as DeLoache and Brown (1984) have shown,
preschoolers often give plausible reasons for an object's
disappearance when it is not in an expected location (e.g., it
must have fallen down the back of the shelf). To minimize this
problem for the second task, the missing object was "retrieved"
on the third search if the child's first two searches had been in
the critical area and the third search looked like it would be
also. Otherwise, the experimenter "found" the missing item in a
critical area search location that had not been searched. As
children could not see into the "rooms," they were instructed to
search for the lost object by feeling with their hands. Finally,
to be consistent with the procedures of the naturalistic task, in
the table-top tasks children were also promised a sticker if they
found the lost object.
Results
Preliminary inspection of the data showed that, irrespective
of condition, children had little difficulty recalling accurately
the order in which the locations were visited. In the table-top
search tasks, only 8 of 92 overall recall attempts were less than
perfect; and in the natural task, 4 out of 30 recall attempts
were in error. Initial analyses also showed that the
correlations between a child's age and his or her search
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performance in any of the conditions were not statistically
different from zero. These data, then, show that neither the
ability to remember the order in which locations were visited nor
a child's age affected search performance.
The purpose of the main analysis was to determine whether
the frequency of searches in the critical area of a table-top
task changed as the result of searching initially in a
naturalistic or a different table-top task, or as the result of
being asked questions about previous search behaviors. The
frequency with which each of the 10 locations was examined in
searching for the missing object on each of the three searches,
and for all of the search problems, is reported in Table 2. The
data analyses for the initial and the second search tasks will be
considered separately.
--------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
-----------------------
Logical search performance on the initial search task. The
first question of interest was whether children would conduct
logical searches in the naturalistic task more frequently than in
the table-top task. The critical area locations were, in fact,
examined more often in the naturalistic task (M = 1.83 (64%); SD
= .75) than in the table-top task (M = 1.36 (44%); SD = .84), t
(59) = 2.35, p < .05. Also, 76% (23/30) of first searches were
in the critical area in the naturalistic task. These data
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correspond closely to those of Anooshian et al. (1982) and of
Haake et al., (1980) who found that 70% and 72% respectively of
first searches were in the critical area in similar naturalistic
search tasks. In comparison, significantly fewer (15/31 or 48%)
of the first searches in the table-top task were in the critical
area, Yates corrected Chi square (1 df, N = 61) = 4.06, p < .05.
These data, then, are consistent with those found by previous
researchers in showing that preschooler's logical search
behaviors are affected by the nature of the search task.
Logical search performance on the second task. Childrens'
ability to restrict their three searches to the critical area in
the second task (a table-top task) was examined by a 2 (First
Task: Table-Top or Naturalistic) x 2 (Search Related Questions
after the First Task: Queried or Not Queried) factorial analysis
of variance. Table 3 shows the mean number of searches in the
critical area. Children who searched first in a naturalistic task
searched in the critical area of the second task more frequently
than those who searched first in a table-top task, F(1,57) =
4.85, p < .05. Further, children who attempted to answer task-
related questions after the initial search task examined critical
area locations more often in the second task than those who were
not asked questions, F(1,57) = 8.14, p < .01. The interaction
between the type of initial task and whether children were asked
questions was not statistically reliable, F < 1. These data are
consistent with the view that attempts to answer context-relevant
questions, and the solution of easy problems prior to attempting
a related but more difficult one, increases the likelihood of
solving the latter problem.
Insert Table 3 about here
Chance responding. Further analyses were conducted to
determine whether the number of searches in the critical area
differed from what would be expected by chance. There are
several ways of setting the criteria for chance responding. If
all 10 search locations are regarded as equiprobable hiding
places for the lost object, then it would be expected that 30% of
all three searches would be in the critical area by chance alone
(3/10 of the 3 searches). However, from an inspection of Table
2, it is evident that children in the naturalistic task did not
regard the impossible location (location 4) as a possible hiding
place; accordingly it was necessary to select a more stringent
criterion for chance responding for this group (3/9 or 33% of the
3 searches).
To compare performance on the first and the second search
problems, the two initial search groups were subdivided into two
further groups on the basis of the four second search problem
groups (i.e., nature of first search task, and whether children
were asked questions). Children who searched first in the
naturalistic condition examined critical area locations at an
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above chance level, t's (14) = 4.52 and 4.00, p's < .01, whereas
the critical area searches of children in the table-top condition
were not significantly different from chance, t(14) = 1.17, and
t(15) = 1.90. For the second search problem all children,
except those who who were not asked questions after the first
table-top problem, searched in the critical area at above chance
levels (Natural--Questions: t(14) = 7.06, p < .01; Natural--No
Questions: t(14) = 3.33, p < .01; Table-Top--Questions: t(15) =
6.11, p < .01; and Table-Top--No Questions: t(14) = 1.25, ns).
These data indicate that children selected search locations in
both the first and the second table-top tasks randomly, unless
asked questions about their initial search, or unless they
searched initially under naturalistic conditions.
Answering task-related questions. Additional analyses were
conducted to examine the relation between the ability to answer
the three questions about task 1 search behaviors and task 2
performance. The number of children who answered each of the
probe questions adequately for both the natural and the table-top
task is reported in Table 4. To be credited with answering a
question adequately, children had to articulate the reason for
searching or not searching in a specified location. It is
possible that the ability to answer the probe questions
appropriately would affect the likelihood of searching in the
critical area in task 2. Alternatively, it is possible that
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merely asking the questions is sufficient to induce access to
logical search strategies.
Using linear regression analyses, no relation was found
between the number of questions answered about the initial search
problems and the likelihood of searching in the critical area in
the second problem. These data, then, show that simply asking
search-appropriate questions was sufficient to induce children to
search in the critical area in the second task. Although there
was a trend for children to provide more adequate answers to
questions about the naturalistic compared to the table-top task,
the difference was not statistically reliable, t(30) = 1.94, ns.
Insert Table 4 about here
Discussion
Four-year-olds searched in the critical area of a table-top
search task more often if they had previously searched in a
naturalistic rather than a different table-top task or, had been
asked task-related questions about earlier search activities.
Mere exposure to a previous table-top task did not lead to an
increase in logical search behavior on a second table-top task,
with children searching in non-critical locations as often as in
critical area locations. These results provide support for two
interrelated conclusions. First, the skills required for logical
search do not appear to be "welded" to specific search contexts.
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Second, inducing access to logical search skills, either through
easy-to-hard problem sequencing or by asking logical search-
relevant questions, can lead to the accessed skills being used in
contexts where they would not otherwise be used. These results,
then, are consistent with previous research, but go beyond them
in showing how logical search skills might develop.
Before considering this interpretation, one aspect of the
current study needs comment. One goal of previous research has
been to show that critical area searching is due to the use of
logical search skills rather than the use of spatial-associative
search strategies (Anooshian et al., 1982; Haake et al., 1980);
that is, due to logical inference behaviors rather than
strategies in which search is directed toward locations
associated with the missing object (locations 1 and 2 in the
present study). It is difficult to dissentangle the two types of
strategy-use in this and other studies because children who
search the location where the object was last seen (location 2),
could be using either logical search or spatial-associative
strategies. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the number of
searches in locations 1 and 2 in the naturalistic task reflects
the use of spatial-associative search strategies (see Table 2).
However, this interpretation is unlikely because of the high
number of searches in critical area locations (locations 2, 3,
and 5). The results of the present and previous research, then,
provide converging evidence that preschooler's critical area
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searches are guided by logical search strategies and are not an
artifact of spatial-associative search strategies.
Under some conditions children searched in the critical area
more often than outside of it. This finding could be interpreted
in one of two ways. First, it implies that in attempting to
locate the missing object children were able to synthesize
search-relevant information some of the time. Second, it could
also imply that they interpreted their inferences
probabilistically rather than absolutely, and saw the critical
area as the likely, but not the only place to search. The second
position is similar to saying that young children used pragmatic
(probabilistic) rather than logical (absolute) inferences in
guiding their search.
These two explanations need not be mutually exclusive. It
seems likely that a pragmatic search mode may come into operation
when the processing demands of the task are too high to allow the
integration of information necessary for logical search. This
account may explain why more of the first searches were in the
critical area than the second or third searches. The information
processing load increases after the first search because both
task-relevant information has to be remembered, as well as the
locations searched and those yet to be searched. In such
circumstances, a pragmatic search mode may be adopted by default.
This interpretation may also help explain why logical search is
enhanced both by searching in a naturalistic task, and by prior
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search-appropriate questions; in both instances, the processing
load is reduced allowing logical search to operate.
How did the naturalistic task facilitate logical search
activity? Several researchers (Brown & Reeve, in press;
Gelman, 1978; Reeve, 1985b) have argued that so-called
naturalistic tasks provide a supportive scaffold for cognitive
activity. According to this view, strategic skills first emerge
in the context of day-to-day meaningful activities where the
cognitive demands for problem solving have been reduced to a
mimimum. It seems likely that the activity of searching in the
naturalistic task served a priming function for the later formal
task; that is, relevant search strategies had been accessed and
mapped onto the subsequent search problem.
Asking search-relevant questions about the initial search
task resulted in an increased number of searches in the critical
area in the second table-top task. This finding is consistent
with other research on the effect of questioning on young children's
reasoning abilities (Brown et al., in press; Reeve, 1985a). What
cognitive function does question-asking serve? It has been
argued that attempts to answer task-appropriate queries lead to
the placement of problem solving routines in working memory,
making them available for use (Ericcson & Simon, 1980). As young
children typically possess poor planning skills, and often fail
to access required problem solving information (Brown et al.,
1983), answering queries may help them overcome this limitation.
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However, further research is necessary if we are to understand
fully the role of questioning in facilitating problem solving.
Two issues in particular need to be examined. First, in
this and other studies, questions were carefully engineered to
focus children explicitly on the task dimensions defined as
central to the problem solving enterprise. Understanding the
cognitive consequences of questioning demands predicting the
effects of different kinds of questions on problem solving. It
might be expected that general task-related questions would have
less impact on performance than explicit questions. Further,
this effect may change with age, with general questions becoming
as effective as explicit ones in facilitating performance.
Second, in the current study, the ability of children to provide
adequate answers to questions seemed less important to effective
search behavior than the thought processes invoked by the
questions. The facilitating effect of the questions was
observed independent of the "difficulty" of the first search
task. It seems likely that the level of problem difficulty needs
to be within a child's "bandwidth of competence" (Brown & Reeve,
in press) for questioning to be of benefit in facilitating
performance on a subsequent task. However, the relation between
task difficulty, questions, and problem solving performance
needs to be thoroughly investigated.
The current research, then, extends our knowledge of young
children's logical search ability in showing that these skills
Memory for Locations
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are not necessarily context bound, but that they can be used
flexibly and applied to new contexts. It is no longer
sufficient for those interested in cognitive development to
identify the conditions under which young children first exhibit
cognitive skills. Effort needs to be devoted to identifying the
circumstances under which children apply their limited repertoire
of skills to new problems. The present research suggests that
both easy-to-hard problem sequencing and task-appropriate
questioning play a role in facilitating the use of cognitive
skills. Future research needs to isolate more specifically the
function of these two factors in fostering problem solving.
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Table 1
Stories used for the Table-Top Tasks
Table 2
Frequency Each Location was Examined for the Three Searches
Location
Story 1 - Bert and his Toy Truck
Event 1. Here is Bert in front of the door to his house. He has
a new truck with him. He is going through the house to show
everyone his new truck.
Event 2. Bert walked into Ernie's room to show him his new
truck.
Event 3. Then he went into Grover's room to show him the truck.
Event 4. And then he went into Barkley's room.
Event 5. Then he knocked at the door of Kermit's bedroom, but
he didn't answer and the door was locked.
Event 6. Instead, he went on to Cookie Monster's room.
Event 7. Then Bert went to Big Bird's room. When he got there,
he noticed that he did not have his new truck any more.
Event 8. He ran into the last room of the house to find someone
to help him find his new truck.
Event 9. Then Bert came out of the end of the house without his
truck.
Story 2 - Snoopy and his Suitcase
Event 1. Here is Snoopy in front of his house. He has his
suitcase with him. Snoopy is going on vacation, but first he is
going to go through the house and say good-bye to his friends.
Event 2. Snoopy carried his suitcase into Charlie Brown's room
to say good-bye.
Event 3. Then he went into Sally's room to say he was going, and
show her his heavy suitcase.
Event 4. Then he went into Lucy's room.
Event 5. Snoopy then went to Pig-pen's door, but the door had
just been painted so he didn't go in.
Event 6. Instead, he went to Linus's room.
Event 7. Then he went into Peppermint Patty's room, but when he
got there, he noticed he didn't have his suitcase anymore.
Event 8. He ran through the last room of the house to get
someone to help him find his suitcase.
Event 9. Then Snoopy appeared out of the end of the house
without his suitcase.
Note. In both stories children saw the referent object carried
into, but not out of the house; and Events 2 through 8 correspond
to rooms 1 through 7 in the natural task.
Search
Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 X
Task 1: Natural Taska
15
7
4
0 3 3 0
0 4 2 3
0 5 3 3
15 26 17 0 15 8 6 5
Task 1: Table-Top Taskb
12 13 13 10 15 7 11 12
Task 2: Task 1 = Natural and No Questions Before Task 2 c
5 10 11 5 6 3 2 3
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Table 2 (cont'd)
Task 2: Task I = Natural and Questions Before Task 2c
2 1
3 1
Table 2 (Cont'd)
a Number of subjects = 30.
b Number of subjects = 31.
c Number of children in each group = 15.
d Number of children in the group = 16.
3 10 12 3 12 2 0 3
Task 2: Task 1 = Table-Top and No Questions Before Task 2c
3 1
2 3
1 2
6 8 6 6 4 1 3 11
Task 2: Task 1 = Table-Top and Questions Before Task 2d
5 12 11 3 8 3 5
Note. Locations 2, 3, and 5, constitute the critical search
area; locations 6, and 7 were visited after the object was
discovered missing; location 1 was visited with the object; and
X location(s) were never visited (n=3).
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Table 3
Mean Number of Searches in the Critical Area in Task 2
Initial Task
Questioned
After
Task 1
Table 4
Number of Children Who Answered the Probe Questions Adequately
Task 1
Question Natural
Number Succeed FailNatural. Table-Top
9 6
Table-Top
Succeed Fail
4 12
M SD M SD 2 11 4
Note. Question 1: Why search in the critical area?
Question 2: Why not search in impossible location?
Question 3: Why not search in location not visited?Note. Maximum number of searches is 3.
aNumber of children in each group = 15.
bNumber of children in group = 16.
31
Yes
No
2.27 (. 7 0 )a
1.80 (. 9 4 )a
1.94 (.68) b
1.20 (.94) a
9 6
11


